Five years ago, we became uranium bulls. We explained how the market had quietly slipped into a structural deficit, with reactor demand outstripping mine supply. Fuel buyers used so-called “secondary supplies” to fill the gap — notably large commercial stockpiles accumulated following the 2011 Fukishima nuclear accident. At the time, investors did not pay uranium any attention at all. The premiere Western uranium producer, Cameco, changed hands at $9 per share (20 percent below its tangible book value) and held nearly $800 million of cash on its balance sheet.

By the first quarter of 2019, no uranium company on any exchange sported a double-digit stock price, a sign that investors had given up on the industry. Investor attitude is entirely different today. Bloomberg consistently reports on structural deficits. Instead of trading for $9, a share of Cameco now changes hands for more than $50.

Why start our natural gas essay with a discussion of uranium?

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